

Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda

REPORT OF SATISFACTION SURVEY

Sarah BIMBONA

&

Sabastiano RWENGABO

Centre for Basic Research (CBR)
15 Baskerville Avenue, Kololo
P.O. Box 9863,
Kampala – UGANDA (0256)

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Abbreviations & Acronyms

ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
AU	African Union
CBR	Centre for Basic Research
CE	Civic Education
CECU	Civic Education Coalition of Uganda
CECU	Civic Education Coordination Unit
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
EAC	East African Community
ICT	Information Communication Technologies
IP	Implementing Partner (to the DGF)
KII	Key-Informant Interview
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	National Planning Authority
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
POMA	Public Order Management Act
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UN-NGOF	Uganda National NGO Forum
UPIMAC	Uganda Project Implementation and Management Centre

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Summary

This Satisfaction Survey assessed the extent to which the project “Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda”, met its intended objectives. The project, is an 18-months intervention between Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and Centre for Basic Research (CBR) entailed conducting research and building the capacity of DGF’s Implementing Partners (IPs) to undertake evidence-based civic education, as well as holding monthly expert seminars on civic education in Uganda. The survey was conducted as an end-of-project investigation, covering only DGF IPs and participants in CBR seminars. The goal was to assess the satisfaction of project beneficiaries, vis-à-vis CBR and DGF interventions under the project.

The survey combined qualitative and quantitative methods, and focused on four aspects of satisfaction: (i) satisfaction with government’s upholding of citizens’ rights; (ii) inclusion of key issues raised by DGF IPs in government decision-making processes; (iii) citizen-focused issues taken on by government; and (iv) satisfaction with CBR support in enhancing civic education. An assessment is was made about CBR’s interventions in relation to the broad challenge of democratic agenda setting, analysed along: research interventions, capacity-building interventions, and expert seminars.

Using Krejcie & Morgan (1970)’s approach¹, 18 IPs and 32 expert seminar participants were included in the target sample. Of the 18 IPs contacted, only 12 IPs participated in the study, others failing to do so for various reasons detailed in this report. This gave a response rate of 67%. A survey tool was emailed to each of the 32 expert seminar participants, and 24 questionnaires were returned. However, four (4) were dropped from further analysis because they were less than 30% complete. This gave a usable response rate of 63%, which is acceptable while conducting surveys.

30% of respondents were University graduates, 30% postgraduate and 20% were doctoral degree (PhDs) holders. The remaining 20% had secondary (10%) and tertiary (10%) education. 85% of the respondents were male.

¹ Krejcie & Morgan, “Determining Sample Size for Research Activities”.

Findings and recommendations are summarized hereunder:

1. There is general satisfaction, among DGF partners, with CBR work of research and information dissemination on civic education
2. There is general dissatisfaction with the extent to which government upholds citizens' rights, specifically the right to access to justice, respect for the socioeconomic and welfare rights of the poor and marginalised, and the right to hold state agencies accountable
3. While it appears that key issues raised by DGF IPs are generally included in government decision making, both as indicative of citizen-focussed issues taken on by government and as indicative of awareness about citizen demands, government's implementation of decisions is hardly adequate, which makes it less responsive and less citizen-centred
4. Most implementing partners (IPs) are satisfied with CBR's capacity-building interventions considering the limits of time and resources. Specifically, the new research tools and methods training provided to IPs was satisfactory in enhancing the knowhow and capacity of IPs to conduct some research, design projects, engage beneficiaries and partners more meaningfully, and enrich the content and quality of their interventions.
5. CBR research and information dissemination activities, specifically monthly expert seminars, were satisfactory to participating organisations and individuals. Participants were generally grateful for not just the opportunity to participate but the conceptual clarity provided by CBR on the question of civic education in Uganda
6. There are concerns that CBR's civic education debates and discussions are limited to urban areas and reach few media houses. This makes the process less accessible to rural and unschooled members of the population and those who do not understand the English language. Whilst CBR has an MOU with Wizarts Foundation to build the capacity of CBR to undertake publicity for their work, become more publicly visible, and make the Centre's research products more easily accessible and known, the centre needs to be more deliberate with the media, because the media retains public trust especially in rural areas and unschooled members of the Ugandan society.
7. CBR's research dissemination and expert seminars underscored the crucial role of the media in civic education and multi-stakeholder engagements, including dealing with government. IPs were emphatic that CBR needs to be more deliberate with the media, because the media [still] retains public trust, in a context where *the state, religious organisations and groups, civil*

society, market, and academia, face a credibility crisis. Therefore, media should be prioritised as a key partner in CBR's CE-related work, because the traditional "write it down, put it in a book, put it in the library" approach cannot be sufficient for CE in a country with an inadequate reading culture. The Centre's on-going pioneering effort with Wizarts Foundation is sowing seeds of engaging the media differently, an effort that both the Wizarts Foundation and CBR ought to deepen and widen.

8. Most IPs, beneficiaries of CBR interventions, and participants in monthly expert seminars, insisted that time-bound interventions, such as CBR/DGF two-year project, have serious limitations with regard to capacity building and civic education. Capacity building and civic education should be continuous, ceaseless, in spite of the possible counteracting forces and failure to show tangible outcomes in a short time. Hence, interested parties, if they are able to acquire funding sources, should consider a multi-stakeholder process running for at least 10 years.
9. CBR, DGF, and IPs, should work together to build a long-term sustainable strategy for pushing these interventions forward. This can entail identifying core capacity-building, civic-education interventions, seeking more sustainable funding and developing *conceptual clarity* on what is desired in CE. Partnerships can also be in developing and implementing an M&E plan for the long term, simplifying the research findings to make them easy to consume, and developing various products from the research (short papers, video clips, online posts and blogs, and other small products) which can be easily disseminated and generate public interest and debate in these issues.
10. DGF and CBR should prioritise strengthening expert seminars as spaces for uncensored interaction between the State and non-state actors, and work with media houses to enhance visibility and participation in the seminars.
11. CBR's research products remain less well accessible to non-academic audiences, such as CSOs, private sector, and government, yet these stakeholders need evidence to make informed decisions and choices on governance. Accordingly, CBR needs to develop and utilise capacity to simplify, package, and market its knowledge into diverse products in a more encompassing manner. Simple knowledge products like policy briefs, technical briefs, info-sheets, infographics, calls-to-action papers, and fact-sheets are useful in making CBR's work inform everyday choices of major governance actors within and outside the State.

12. In addition to providing a “*Uganda Conceptualisation of Civic Education*”, through ensuring conceptual clarity, CBR needs to deepen its interrogation of the theory and practice of democracy in Uganda, in keeping with recent works, such as Joe Oloka-Onyango and Josephine Ahikire, *Controlling Consent: Uganda’s 2016 Elections* (Trenton N.J.: Africa World Press, 2017). Is Uganda witnessing genuine democratic governance or is what we are witnessing fallacious political choices meant to legitimise a regime that lacks democratic intents?

Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda.

Introduction

Democratic agenda setting is a major aspect of responsive governance and facilitates the attainment of a country's legitimate development objectives.² This is a process: (i) by which citizens, on whose behalf and in whose service elected and appointed leaders wield and exercise decision-making power; (ii) by which citizens actively participate in determining the governance agenda of their locales through different processes facilitated by the state; and (iii) through which leaders may be held accountable for their choices and actions. Agenda setting requires concrete information to enrich citizen participation and inform government decisions. Democratising societies need to strengthen evidence-based agenda setting because evidence enables both citizens and government to make informed choices. An informed citizenry makes more meaningful contribution to state-led decision-making processes than uninformed individuals and groups. Citizens access information through several channels, but civic education (CE) has the most wide-ranging reach and impact.³

Consistent with the above-acknowledged relationship between informed citizen participation and democratic governance, Centre for Basic Research (CBR), working with Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), have been implementing a project (June 2018 and December 2020). The project, titled *Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda*, was premised on the assumption that CE is one of the foundations upon which democracy thrives. The project, therefore, sought to produce, manage, and disseminate CE-related knowledge in a way that enables CE stakeholders and practitioners to pragmatically engage duty bearers and the citizenry to enhance democratic governance practices.

² Republic of Uganda, 2015, *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 – 2019/20*. Kampala: National Planning Authority (NPA)

³ Sigal M. Ben-Porath, 2015, 'Citizenship as Shared Fate: Education for Membership in a Diverse Democracy', *Educational Theory* 62 (4): 381-395; Benon C. Basheka, 2018, "Final Evaluation of the Democratic Governance Facility Phase 1 plus (DGF1+) Pilot ToT Civic Education Project (Dec. 2016-Dec. 2017)", Kampala: DGF

The project entailed conducting studies on pertinent civic-education thematic areas, analysing primary and secondary data generated, and appropriately packaging and disseminating findings via monthly seminars held at the centre and media. Different publications and media events characterised dissemination of findings. Alongside these measures, CBR's multi-stakeholder monthly seminars were intended to enrich and inform debate and learning about democratic governance agendas and interventions by civil society. This laid the groundwork for possible continuities in civil-society-sensitive democratic agenda setting that Uganda needs to embrace and strengthen.

Strengthening evidence-based democratic agenda setting is a three-pronged process. Its first prong consists in generating reliable evidence, through rigorous research and analytic processes, about the context of agenda setting. This involves asking and seeking answers to questions like: is the political context and environment conducive to democratic agenda setting or is the environment akin to autocratic and/or dictatorial agenda setting in governance? Are there rules of the game and institutional structures that allow for and facilitate democratic agenda setting? Are there spaces—legislated, claimed, etc—that allow different actors, especially citizens, to take part in agenda setting? Are citizens organised enough, through civil society structures like non-governmental organisations, citizen groups and professional and interest group associations, to enable them participate in governance-related agenda setting? Is participation meaningful; that is, are the voices of non-state actors heard, received, and integrated in the policy processes (policymaking and implementation)? Once these and similar questions are answered, it becomes possible to identify areas that require strengthening, whether by the state, international organisations, civil society actors, or academic and capacity-building institutions.

The second aspect is the utilisation of findings in a manner that strengthens citizens' participation in the governance agenda-setting process. This entails engagement with organised citizens, broadly conceived as civil society, through appropriate channels, such as media, citizen groups, religion-cultural formations, and market structures. Civil society groups may engage one another in these respects, such as by undertaking capacity-building interventions that CBR has been implementing with DGF IPs.

The third and final prong consists in determining the extent to which interventions to strengthen participation and engagement in agenda setting, by the organised citizenry, achieve the goal of promoting democratic governance. This focuses on

specific action-research activities. This is aimed at unravelling the usefulness of such interventions, the new opportunities and challenges generated by the interventions, and possible modifications that may be needed.

From the foregoing, this Satisfaction Survey was undertaken to assess the extent to which the project "*Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda*", met its intended objectives of enhanced capacity of LGs to deliver quality public services through four strategies (a) Undertaking advocacy for increased LG financing; (b) Enhancing accountability and transparency of Local Governments; (c) Strengthening the institutional capacity of ULGA and its affiliates, and; (d) Improving learning and documentation by ULGA. The survey was conducted as an end-of-project investigation to assess the satisfaction of project beneficiaries, vis-à-vis CBR and DGF interventions under the project. The findings general satisfaction, among DGF partners, with CBR work of research and information dissemination, and with the Centre's capacity-building interventions; dissatisfaction with the extent to which government upholds citizens' rights; CBR's research products remain less well accessible to non-academic audiences; and the underlying potential of nuanced enjoyments with media.

The rest of this report is organised as follows. Section 1 provides the background information about the project and the Satisfaction Survey, and ends with the approach to and methodology for the Satisfaction Survey. Section 2 presents the findings of the Satisfaction Survey, in relation to specific issues: Level of satisfaction with government in upholding citizens' rights; Level of inclusion of key issues raised by DGF IPs in government decision making; Citizen focussed issues taken on by government; and Level of satisfaction with CBR support in enhancing civic engagement. Section 3 provides a synthesis of the findings in the context of the broad agenda on strengthening evidence-based democratic governance agenda setting and engagement, by civil society, in Uganda. Section 4 presents conclusions and makes recommendations to CBR, DGF, and IPs.

1. The DGF/CBR Project and Satisfaction Survey

1.1 The Project

The project was premised on the assumption that civic education is one of the foundations upon which democracy thrives. The project, therefore, sought to produce, manage and disseminate knowledge in a way that enables civic education stakeholders and practitioners to pragmatically engage duty bearers and the citizenry to enhance democratic governance practices, specifically

citizen participation in agenda-setting processes of government. The project, among other strategies, undertook research on pertinent civic education thematic areas, analysed primary and secondary data generated from the research, and appropriately packaged and disseminated the findings of the various researches. Accordingly, different kinds of publications, media events, and public activities were tailored to inform democratic governance agendas and to enrich interventions by civil society groups that are engaged in civic education. Particular attention was paid to DGF Implementing Partners (IPs). This was hoped to enhance citizen engagements with government at different levels, which strengthens democratic practices. Thirteen different studies undertaken under the project are available but not published⁴. Different organisations were targeted during the different studies.⁵

In addition to studies, CBR also conducted Monthly Expert Seminars on Civic Education. These multi-stakeholder, multi-diverse, and inter- and cross-generational seminars, served to achieve a convergence between theories and practices of civic education in Uganda. The Seminars provided opportunities for leading intellectuals and civic education practitioners to engage with emerging civic education issues. This enriched their grasp of the contribution of CE to deepening democratic governance and of the current discourse on CE that has

1. These include: (1) Mapping of Organizations involved in civic education; (2) An annotated bibliography on civic education resources and materials; (3) Study on the Research Capacity Training Needs Assessment of DGF IPs to inform Capacity Strengthening support to the IPs that was to be provided by CBR; (4) Desk review of the theoretical literature on civic education relevant to Uganda; (5) Expert Analysis of the National Budget and funding priorities of government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs); (6) Study on the National Civic Education Policy; (7) Desk Review of the Civic Education Curriculum; (8) Expert analysis of the national budget and funding priorities of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) (2011/12 to 2018/19), and Expert analysis of the national budget to understand the public financing of civic education and funding priorities of MDAs in the FY2019/2020 Budget; (10) A review of the political context in the country in relations to how it is influencing civic education agendas by civil society undertaken in support of the Coalition on Civic Education in Uganda (CECU); (11) Comprehensive Review of Civic Education in Uganda; and (12) Study on 'identification of possible areas for Legislation on Civic Education in Uganda'.

2. For instance: African Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (ACTV); African Leadership Institute (AFLI); Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO); Civic Response on Environment and Development (CRED); Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG); Council for African Policy (CAP); Human Rights Centre Uganda (HRC); Platform for Labour Action (PLA); Uganda Debt Network (UDN); Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC); Uganda Media Women's Association (UMWA); Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF); Uganda Women's Network (UWONET); Wizarts Foundation; Uganda Youth Network (UYONET); Uganda Project Implementation Management Centre (UPIMAC), and Restless Development.

been undertaken by state and non-state actors. The different approaches, delivery mechanisms, impact, and promise about the future was examined within these seminars. The seminars provided an interactive platform for researchers, academics, policy makers and the general public to debates the practical necessities of making CE a vehicle for improving citizens' civic competences. They exhibited free intellectual debates on the appropriateness of the civic knowledge generated in which are embodied the country's core values and principles. It seemed apparent that on the basis of such national values and principles civic competencies and dispositions can be nurtured.⁶

Participants in the seminars revealed that the seminars enabled the organisers and participants to conceptually clarify CE, understand the changing dynamics of CE in Uganda, the role of different stakeholders, and to appreciate the crisis of lack of national values and principles.⁷ While seminars enabled participants to think beyond their political, occupational, intellectual and cultural dispositions, seminars could not meaningfully influence the broad democratic governance processes because they were a short-term intervention and only centred in Kampala, making them mere starting-points for extending and widening the reach of organised civic debates on governance in the country.

In other word, participants maintain that a framework and process, for making these debates nation-wide and multi-level for a much longer period, would be more impactful and is thus a worthwhile consideration in CBR's future works on Civic Education. Such a process and framework would enable the country to generate minimum consensual understanding of the social and political origins of the competing interpretations of Uganda's history, a deeper learning of how ordinary citizens can play a more constructive role in strengthen state and non-state institutions and processes of democratic governance, and enhance citizen agency in agenda setting. In total, 19 expert seminars were held.⁸

This survey reveals that during implementation, CBR undertook many different activities in a very short period. Conducting several studies and seminars concurrently was a demanding exercise that held both CBR researchers and partners busy while also enabling them to continually subject their findings to

⁶ Fieldwork findings, March – July 2020

⁷ Ibid

⁸ The CE Monthly Expert Seminars held since June 2018 can be located from CBR's record of these seminars.

independent critical voices and intellectual exchanges. The Centre was able to draw on its multi-disciplinary expert team, built over many years, to maintain concurrent research and seminars. This enabled researchers to receive timely and continuous feedback between field- and desk-research findings and seminar discussions. While some of the findings were presented during seminars, in this study, respondents were concerned that results have not been published into a comprehensive product that can last longer and reach wider audiences now and in the future. CBR's ongoing process of publishing a book on *Civic Education in Uganda* covering these issues will address this concern.

1.2 The Satisfaction Survey

This Survey was conducted under the paradigmatic conviction that CBR/DGF was providing a service to an interested customer, specifically IPs, whose satisfaction is critical for the relevance of the services rendered now and in future. Customer satisfaction is one of the tools prescribed to managers and organisations to provide them with information need for decision making to improve performance. Accordingly there is increased literature pointing to the link between organizational performance and the level of satisfaction reported by its customers (Mukankusi et al., 2008). While CBR is a traditional research centre engaged mainly in basic research, its applied research capabilities have not been previously assessed in a context of multi-actor processes of research and debates on an important topics.

Accordingly, this survey was conducted among DGF beneficiary partners who also participated in CBR studies and seminars. It was intended to determine:

- (i) Level of satisfaction with government in upholding citizens' rights;
- (ii) Level of inclusion of key issues raised by DGF IPs in government decision making;
- (iii) Citizen focussed issues taken on by government;
- (iv) Level of satisfaction with CBR support in enhancing civic engagement.


2. Methodology for the Satisfaction Survey

In this section is outlined the approach and methodology by which the objectives of the assignment were achieved. This is built onto the international best practices for conducting customer satisfaction studies.

2.1 Approach

To start the assignment, consultants met with CBR Team to harmonize expectations of both sides and discussed the proposed work plan; and thereafter agreed on the way forward. The approach to the assignment was fully participatory, in close consultation with key stakeholders.

Figure 1: Chronological Approach to the Survey



2.2 Survey Methodology

This study used a descriptive cross-sectional survey design. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used with the aid of a questionnaire and Key Informant Interview guide (KII) respectively. The quantitative data collection targeted IPs to acquire their understanding of, and satisfaction with, the *Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting*

and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda project. A questionnaire was used to collect views from participants in expert seminars.

2.3 Sampling design and sample size

The study used purposive sampling because specific IPs were the focus of the survey. Respondents were obtained from lists provided by CBR that contained both IPs and expert seminar participants. Contact address for 18 IP member organisations, who had received support from DGFs, was provided. Respondents were civil society leaders who had experience in civic education and were prepared to share their experiences. Another list of 35 participants who had attended CBR expert seminars was used as the sampling frame.

2.4 Sample size determination

The sample size was estimated in each category to enable consultants achieve 95% confidence interval. Using Krejcie & Morgan's approach, 17 IPs were included in the target sample and 32 expert seminar participants. Each member on the participants' list was given an equal chance to participate in the study. A short telephone call was made during the screening stage to locate and determine each respondent's eligibility and willingness to participate in the study before scheduling an interview or emailing the survey questionnaire.

Of the 18 IPs contacted, 4 had changed their contact addresses. 2 could not commit to physical interviews and did not respond to the emails. As a result of these instances of non-participation and non-availability, 12 IPs participated in the study. This gives a response rate of 67%. The survey tool was emailed to each one of the 32 expert seminar participants who were targeted for survey. 4 emails bounced/did not get through via the provided email contacts. Only one person returned a completed tool within a week. However, because CBR had invited participants to an expert seminar the following week, during registration, each participant was handed a questionnaire and were asked to fill and return at the end of the expert seminar. 23 participants returned the questionnaire totalling to 24. Of the 24 questionnaires received, four (4) were dropped from further analysis because they were less than 30% complete. Thus, the response rate was 63% which is generally acceptable while conducting surveys.

2.5 Data collection

Two data-collection methods were used for each group within the targeted sample. For IPs, face-to-face interviews were conducted with key informants on the different study objectives. However, when the novel Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) broke out and government from March 2020 imposed restrictions, the data collection tools were emailed to few remaining IPs, who filled and emailed back to the consultants. In addition, a structured questionnaire was used to gather data from expert seminar participants who attended seminars at CBR.

2.6 Data Management and Analysis

After data collection, the information was extracted for each group. SPSS20 was used to analyse quantitative data from expert seminar participants. Cleaning was done to check out for inconsistencies and outliers. Interviews were conducted between March and June 2020 and each interview lasted between 45 min to 1 hour. These were then transcribed, coded and analysed via content analysis to derive key themes and levels of participant satisfaction. Some interviewees were assigned pseudonyms used in data analysis to preserve the anonymity of the participants i.e. SEAS 1, SEAS 2, SEAS 3, SEAS 4, SEAS 5, SEAS 6, SEAS 7, SEAS 8 SEAS 9, SEAS 10, SEAS 11 and SEAS 12.

3. Results and discussion of the Satisfaction Survey

The findings and results of this survey indicate general satisfaction with what CBR was able to achieve within the short period of implementing the project, concurrent with calls for more grassroots engagements in CE activities, implementation of CE outcomes and involvement of participants in electing seminar topics and thematics. The DGF/CBR project also established networks of collaboration among different implementing partners. These IPS had hitherto operated in insular orbits, in silos. These networks may outlive the December 2020 expiry of this project if deliberate effort is made to retain these partnerships and collaborations on other projects, if not through sharing of information then by designing joint interventions in areas of shared interests.

3.1 Characteristics of Respondents

Table 1: Characteristics of Respondents - Level of education

Qualification	Percent
Degree	30
PHD	20
Postgraduate	30
Secondary	10
Tertiary	10
Total	100

Source: Primary data

Table 1, reveals that 30% of respondents had at least a University degree, with 30% hold postgraduate qualifications, and 20% holding doctoral degrees (PhD). The remaining 20% had secondary (10%) and tertiary (10%) education. This indicates that CBR interventions under this project were concentrated amongst the more educated section of the Ugandan society. This is unsurprising because most DGF partners are Kampala-based civil society organisations (CSOs) which are mainly founded and staffed by educated Ugandans. The study also revealed that only

15% of participants are female. Of the respondents 15% were female whilst 85% were male.

Table 2: Respondents' Categorisation


Category	Percent
CBR research fellow	35
CBR staff member	5
Civic Education Coalition of Uganda	25
Other CSO	5
DGF implementing partner	10
Ministry of Information	5
National Guidance (MICT&NG)	5
Other Government Departments, Ministries	5
Student	5
Total	100

Source: Primary data

As highlighted in Table 2, majority of the respondents to the satisfaction survey (35%) were CBR fellows, with the civic education coalition of Uganda coming second at 20%. Government officials and students were the minority (5% each). It should be noted that many of the CBR research fellows are also involved in civil society work, and some of the CSOs that were reached via the project are staffed and led by CBR research fellows.

3.2 CBR Expert Seminar Series

Figure 2: Rating of CBR Expert Seminar Series



Source: Primary data

Figure 2, reveals general satisfaction with CBR expert seminars, with an average of 90%. That is, 90% of respondents were satisfied with the quality of the seminars, 85% with the accessibility of the venue for the seminars, and 90% with reliability of these seminars in strengthening the capacity of CSOs and citizens in undertaking civic education. Following is a thematic breakdown of these findings.

3.3 Satisfaction with Government's Upholding Citizens' Rights

From the interviews, IP participants' views on governments' ability to uphold citizens' rights were assessed. The aim was to provide some validation on the trajectory and potentiality of interventions on strengthening evidence-based democratic governance agenda setting and engagement by civil society in Uganda. From the interviews, key issues perceived to be linked to government's upholding of citizens' rights were revealed from the twelve interviews. The aim was to assess the ways in which these issues related to evidence-based democratic governance agenda setting and engagement, as undertaken by civil society, in Uganda. These issues are discussed below and reveal mixed reactions about civil society satisfaction with government's upholding citizens'

rights, and a generally qualitative gap in government's upholding of citizens' rights.

a. Policy Enforcement and implementation of Rules

Interviewees generally suggest that government displays inadequacies when it comes to implementation of constitutional and legal obligations to uphold citizens' rights. While the constitution, international and regional instruments, various domestic laws, and strategy documents display commitment on paper⁹, most of these commitments are not implemented.

"..... Government is a custodian of rights, with a protection role to play. Individual appreciation of human rights is key. Government has not taught people their rights, so there is no appreciation of rights and there is no respect for them. There is limited financing for CE; the money budgeted for CE in framework papers is always later reallocated into other areas: "what is allocated is not what is spent..."¹⁰

While interviews were reasonably satisfied with government performance in accordance with Objective 29 of the constitution, the persistent impunity that characterises violations of other human rights is a great concern. Objective 29 of the 1995 constitution (as amended) enjoins government to uphold scientific principles of peace, unity, equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and other freedoms. The First National Development Plan (NDP I), 2010/11—2013/14 displayed underperformance in several respects.

First, in terms of availability and quality of gainful employment, only 18.5% of Ugandans were engaged in wage employment, while a whopping 72% remaining largely in subsistence agriculture. The right to "gainful employment" was not realized. Second, in addition to an inadequate stock of social and economic infrastructure, the population accessing electricity from the national

⁹ See, for instance: Republic of Uganda, 1995. *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*, Entebbe: UPPC – chapter 4, Art. 51(1); Republic of Uganda, 2007. *Equal Opportunities Commission Act, 2007*, Entebbe: UPPC (The Uganda Gazette No. 23, Volume C, 18th May, 2007); Republic of Uganda, 1997. *The Uganda Human Rights Act* (No. 4 of 1997) (Cap. 24), Entebbe: UPPC; Republic of Uganda, 2019. *The Human Rights (Enforcement) Act, 2019*, Entebbe: UPPC; United Nations (UN), 1948. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, New York: UN; OAU, 1981, *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, Addis Ababa: OAU/AU; EAC, 1999. *Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*, Arusha: EAC

¹⁰ SEAS 5.

grid remained only 14% in 2013, while human capital development remained underdeveloped with only about 4% of Ugandans above 15 years old having educational attainment above the secondary school level.¹¹ Added to poverty, these socioeconomic underdevelopment indicators display inadequacies in provision of social and economic rights.

Finally, in the area of peace and stability, democracy, human rights, and rule of law/access to justice—which is directly related to the DGF/CBR project on strengthening democratic agenda setting—serious implementation gaps remain despite legislations like the Domestic Violence Act, 2010 and the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 2010. these inadequacies are attributed to the myriad implementation challenges, such as: slow implementation of core projects due to inadequate technical capacity in public service; limited alignment of planning and budgeting instruments; limited prioritisation and poor sequencing of interventions; limited financing; weak public sector management (exemplified by, inter alia, conflicting, overlapping and duplication of mandates, poor mind set and negative attitudes, and impunity and non-compliance); and limited involvement of non-state actors especially during implementation.¹²

Government's emancipatory programs, such as mass immunisation, education for all and others regardless of the diversity, have contribute to absolute numbers with serious gaps in the quality of social development.¹³ Government is accused of “over-applying a stick and carrot approach regarding the total guaranteeing of human rights.” The government is perceived to be less practical “with very good policies such as chapter four of the 1995 constitution and others but there is lack of enforcement and implementation [and lack of sufficient] political goodwill.”¹⁴ In other word, government is “doing well in some aspects and doing badly in others”: it pays more attention to civil and political rights, especially during elections, at the expense of economic, social and cultural rights. This implies that a holistic human-rights-based approach to governance, as opposed to a narrow definition of human and citizens' rights, remains work in process. As a result, “the gains sometimes depend on the goodwill of individuals in charge” of

¹¹ Republic of Uganda, 2015. *Second National Development Plan (NDP II) 2015/16 – 2019/20*, Kampala: National Planning Authority

¹² Republic of Uganda, *Ibid*

¹³ SEAS 1

¹⁴ SEAS 7

state institutions.¹⁵ While some attempts to uphold human rights of citizens have been made and are demonstrable¹⁶, the persistent inadequacies in implementation of governance programs that would ensure holistic human rights-based governance render the achievements minimal not only in the economic and social spheres but also in respect to political tolerance.

b. Political Tolerance

Governments can uphold their citizens' rights by exercising political tolerance to opposing groups. This refers to "a willingness to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity—that is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different" from one's political convictions.¹⁷ The willingness to grant equal rights to groups that one political actor dislikes provides an opportunity to address issues confronting intolerance and democracy without the need to take particularistic stances. Political tolerance is also expected from opposition parties, pressure groups and interest groups toward government. It can be measured in terms of acceptance of ideological, sociocultural, ideational, social-class, and ethnic/identity differences between groups within a polity. These differences may consist in expression of those ideas or interests which one may be opposed to at the time or considers to be unworkable in the circumstances.¹⁸

Since political tolerance/intolerance has several determinants—social (e.g. level of education and social status), psychological and personality sources (including level of satisfaction of various needs, or "psychological security"), and political sources (e.g. ideology, threats, and governance norms)¹⁹—it is difficult to apportion blame on government alone for political intolerance especially given the difficulty of balancing rhetoric and action on the part of leaders.

A key approach to determining government's political tolerance, however, is to observe the behaviour and actions of top government leaders, not their rhetoric.

¹⁵ SEAS 8

¹⁶ SEAS 10

¹⁷ James L. Gibson and Richard D. Bingham, 1982. "On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance". *The American Political Science Review*, 76 (3): 603-620, at p. 604

¹⁸ James L. Gibson, 1992. "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance be "Least-Liked"?", *American Journal of Political Science*, 36 (2):560-577.

¹⁹ John L. Sullivan, George E. Marcus, Stanley Feldman and James E. Piereson, 1981. "The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, 75 (1):92-106

The findings indicate that the government has not been politically tolerant to a degree that upholds citizens' rights. Some informants revealed that government thrives not on tolerance but insidious suppression of especially urban middle class while instrumentalising political ignorance and disinterest of rural Ugandans.

"....the urban population have tried to have their voices heard but somehow, the government is silencing them..."²⁰

In other word, despite constitutional and legal stipulations, and public rhetoric, the practice in Uganda does not adequately show a government willing to: (i) ensure that public officials are chosen by majority vote in a free and fair election both within the ruling party and opposition; (ii) allowing all people, regardless of political beliefs, to enjoy the same legal rights and protections as anyone else, when one considers the ways in which security forces treat perceived opposition political parties, groups and individuals; and (iii) allow "free speech for all no matter what their views might be", when we consider the tendency to disallow oppositional political discussions in some media channels.²¹

This finding contrasts with arguments that given the period Uganda has taken holding elections since the 1995 constitution the country has, over the past two-and-half decades, evolved a democratic ethos. This would be akin to Linberg's assertion that "an uninterrupted series of competitive elections imbues society with certain democratic qualities. Repeated elections—regardless of their relative freeness or fairness—appear to have a positive impact on human freedom and democratic values" at least in the African context.²² Perhaps, these perceptions of political intolerance arise amongst the urban intelligentsia, within which the survey was concentrated, who associate political tolerance with a peaceful political transition, a luxury Uganda has yet to enjoy since independence. It is true that the strength of the incumbent in Uganda has rendered our elections less more prone to democratization, if not because domestic and international actors have not adequately pressured the regime²³ then because the regime creates semblance of democratic legitimacy via elections, satisfies external and internal

²⁰ SEAS 12

²¹ Also see Sullivan, et al., "The Sources of Political Tolerance", p. 98

²² Staffan I. Lindberg, 2006, "The Surprising Significance of African Elections", *Journal of Democracy*, 17 (1): 139-151. Q† p. 139

²³ Daniela Donno, 2013, "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes", *American Journal of Political Science*, 57 (3):703–716

actors, and balances electoral credibility with electoral control.²⁴ Perhaps feelings about persistent intolerance reflect general disaffection with recent political developments, such as the violence-riddled constitutional amendments that lifted presidential age limit and the violent by-elections in which some people from the opposition were tortured and/or killed. Perhaps it reflects disaffection with government's tendency to deploy security forces in a partisan manner during elections. It may also be born of disapproval of the leadership's tolerance for, sometimes encouragement of, corruption within security forces "because it serves as an instrument of political control" as opposed to institutional controls.²⁵

Ordinarily, political tolerance consists allowing for a free and fair electoral process in which competing ideological convictions and interests jostle for electoral support amongst a civically-aware citizenry. The findings, however, indicate that "manipulations are common in every election season." Evidence of these manipulations is to be found in all the election reports, court rulings, and studies on Uganda since 1996. From this viewpoint, respondents believe that while government claims to have designed and is implementing initiatives to support civic education, it remains a strong counteracting force against CSO-driven civic education. Government has, for instance, gone as far as removing civics and political education from the education curriculum. This move, some respondents maintain, is intended "to deny citizens that formative stage of building their civic-ness. Majority of the youth in our population are preoccupied with economic interests, are not educated about their citizen agency, and are not prepared to be responsible citizens."²⁶ It is perceived that liberal education was providing ideas to young Ugandans that would generate contrasting ideas and political interests to the ruling movement, and that government was intolerant of the evolution of such ideas and citizens. This may be termed as "institutionalised" intolerance because it consists in influencing institutional processes with the view to curtailing and muzzling opposing political viewpoints and interests.

c. Access to justice

²⁴ Andreas Schedler, 2002, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation", *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2):36-50; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 2002, "Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2):51-65

²⁵ Gerald Bareebe, 2020, "Predators or Protectors? Military Corruption as a Pillar of Regime Survival in Uganda", *Civil Wars*, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2020.1730640

²⁶ KII, Kampala. 3rd March 2020; also Schedler, "Elections without Democracy" and Levitsky & Way, "Elections without Democracy".

In an intolerant political environment, it is difficult to determine whether or not access to justice is upheld. Limited access to justice can partly result from low civic education. Inadequate civic education can in turn constrain access to justice. Although, this cyclic relationship is not addressed in this study, the current survey reveals that amidst weak and corrupt governance institutions and judicial infrastructure, access to justice may sound like a misnomer. Interviewees believe

“.....Government is upholding some rights but muzzling others. For example there is significant level of access to information as a right but there are many cases of torture, no freedom to peacefully protest by citizens and high level of deprivation, [and] limited access to justice”²⁷

It is perceived that poverty also limits access to justice: “most Ugandans live on the edge, contemplating daily survival. Such a population cannot have deliberate interest in political rights like access to justice. As a result, such rights have become secondary to economic survival “because government has made sure Ugandans remain uninformed, unorganised, and easily manipulated”, which erodes principles of access to justice.²⁸

Other interviewees believe the question of access to justice and citizens' political agency needs to be problematized. The citizenry need to “reclaim their citizen and political agency.” According to this view, while there is a façade of a democratized policymaking process appears, many of the policy and legal instruments in Uganda “or those which matter most [such as budget allocations], are made by particular small groups.” In this kind of environment, “*We need to ask the right questions and problematize the whole notion of democracy in Uganda*” because the decision-making actors hardly work for the people.²⁹ This concern may make more sense when we consider that the institutional infrastructure for access to justice, such as administrative conflict-resolution mechanisms, judicial services, and sectioning against violations, are inaccessible, expensive, suffer impunity, lack capacity, and are corrupt.³⁰

²⁷ SEAS 12

²⁸ KII, Kampala. 3rd March 2020.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Sabastiano Rwengabo, 2020. “Resolving Petroleum Conflicts in Uganda's Albertine Graben”, in *Natural Resource Governance and Sustainable Livelihoods in Uganda*, edited by Onesmus Mugenyi, Ronald Naluwairo and Russ Rhoads (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers), ch. 5

The foregoing findings imply that access to justice is a function of the overall socio-political environment within which justice institutions function, the capacity of citizens to pursue justice against both state and non-state actors, and the cost of access to justice. While on paper Ugandans are entitled to justice, in practice they have been denied due to delays in judicial processes, the inability of poor complainants to withstand prolonged processes of contending against more powerful actors, and the inability of state institutions like state attorneys to assist poor citizens in the pursuit of justice when and where required.

d. Freedom of Association

According to Article 38 of the Ugandan Constitution, “everyone has the right to participate in the affairs of government, individually or through his or her representatives in accordance with the law”. This implies formation of political and non-political forms of civil organising with the view to pursuing individual and collective interests. While professional and communal associations are officially allowed, they are not free from government interference especially with regard to assembly. Some informants argue that

“[...The government is abusing the use of its powers through policies such as Public Order Management Act that is used to encroach on the freedoms of association...]”³¹

Citizen associations may be political or non-political. Associations may be formed to pursue a mixture of interests that require engaging with political leaders and government in ways that may or may not be contentious. Citizens organising may arise organically as a result of the work done by organic intellectuals, but it can also arise from external state and non-state actors aimed at enabling specific citizen groups to engage more powerful actors.³² Some interviews revealed that while over the past decade Uganda had embraced civil society engagements with the state, civil society space has progressively “been suffocated basically for those NGOs in governance. There are lots of problems in interpretation of the

³¹ SEAS 9

³² Sabastiano Rwengabo and Gerald Byarugaba, 2018, “Civic Engagement and Community Land Rights in Uganda's Albertine Graben” in *Local Governments in Uganda: Democracy, Accountability and Civic Engagement*, edited by Arthur Bainomugisha, Kiran Cuningham and Lillian Muyomba-Tamale and Wilson Winstons Muhwezi, London: Adonis & Abey Publishers, pp. 135-164

law", the Public Order Management Act (POMA) and NGO Act, which bred misgivings about the intent of these legislations vis-à-vis citizen rights pursued through civil society.³³ Despite disagreement amongst informants on the degree to which government is violating its citizens' rights and freedoms, there is shared belief that some laws like the POMA are used to encroach on these rights and freedoms, which borders on government abusing its constitutional powers.

3.4 Inclusion of Key Issues raised by DGF/IPs in Government Decision Making

Inclusion of issues raised by non-state actors in government decision making and action indicates tolerance for multi-stakeholder governance as well as tendency toward democratic decision-making. This may not be problematic in semi-authoritarian political systems. The key question, then, is the nature of issues to be included and the extent to which those issues that are included in government decisions translate in actions and observed outcomes with positive impact on democratic governance agenda setting and engagement by civil society.

In terms of *nature of the issue*, the more politically-sensitive the issue, the less likely it will be included in government's decision making. Issues that directly affect the regime's political survival tend to be given priority, and government is not as sympathetic to other issues.³⁴ Thus, issues such as Public order management Act, timely compensation of victims of torture, and personal liability for civil and public servants who are responsible for human rights abuse, are more likely to be ignored than issues about environment and climate change. On outcomes of issue inclusion, mention has already been made about the non-implementation of governance frameworks. Government acknowledges "slow implementation, characterized by long procurement cycles, poor enforcement of standards and regulations, and ineffective monitoring and evaluation", remains one of the key setbacks to Uganda's development.³⁵ Thus, inclusion of issues in a government instrument is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving the goal of a civil-society-led democratic-governance agenda setting and engagement. Some interviewees revealed that government does listen to civil society during

³³ SEAS 9 and SEAS 11

³⁴ This is comparable to the speed and concerted effort invested on issues that matter to the ruling regime, such as presidential age limit removal, or even the standard operating procedures (SOPs) on COVID-19 that limit political party activities while leaving NRM-leaning activities unhindered.

³⁵ Republic of Uganda, *Uganda Vision 2040: A Transformed Ugandan Society from a Peasant to a Modern and Prosperous Country within 30 years*, Kampala: NPA, p. 5

policymaking and legislation processes. Some of the issues raised by DGF/IPs have been included in government frameworks. Examples include government's acceptance to pass the Human Rights Enforcement Act, 2019, and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012.

It is possible that if the survey had covered many more CSOs, beyond DGF/IPs, more evidence of government listening to and embracing ideas generated by civil society would have been generated. Despite these moves, however, there are still concerns. First, there are misgivings about abuse of legislations like POMA. Second, torture victims are, according to some interviewees, not compensated in a timely manner. Third, there seems not to be personal liability upon civil and public servants who abuse human rights, which leads to impunity. Third, despite periodic reports made by the Human Rights Commission, various human rights abuses remain unreported.³⁶ Limited reporting of these abuses does not arise because the state is unaware or cannot access evidence of such torture. It is mainly because inclusion of torture experiences—much like inclusion of civil society suggestions in government decision making—

("...seems to be dependent on the extent of lobbying rather than an established structure through which such issues can flow into decision-making..."³⁷)

(...Some of the under-reporting or non-reporting may take place in institutional spaces where key actors are not trained in reporting abuse..."³⁸)

(... sheer impunity prevents reporting and action while allowing for complex forms of signalling and representation..."³⁹)

Non-political issues

Uganda is more willing to discuss non-sensitive issues with civil society than politically-sensitive issues that touch the fore of civil and political rights. While some

³⁶ SEAS 7

³⁷ SEAS 8

³⁸ E.g.: Maureen C. Kenny, 2001, "Child abuse reporting: teachers' perceived deterrents", *Child Abuse & Neglect* 25: 81–92

³⁹ Max Pensky, 2008, "Amnesty on trial: impunity, accountability, and the norms of international law", *Ethics & Global Politics* 1(1):1-40; Adam Branch, 2008, "Against Humanitarian Impunity: Rethinking Responsibility for Displacement and Disaster in Northern Uganda", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 2(2):151-173; Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werne, 2010, "Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan", *The European Journal of International Law*, 21 (4):941–965

CSOs, such as Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) have been engaging government on political issues like budget and resource-allocation and monitoring⁴⁰, respondents retain the conviction that government is willing and ready to listen to issues raised outside politics and governance. Such issues include climatic change, agriculture, and food security. Other issues that are political in nature, such as public-sector accountability, transparency, human rights are sometimes looked at as political opposition or ignored altogether. Perhaps this results from the self-conscious corrupt elite behaviours and practices that have typified the Ugandan governance landscap.⁴¹

Regarding human rights abuses, *government passed the Human Rights Enforcement Act, 2019 and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012.*⁴² *But the same government is too selective of civil society recommendations. It accepted “research recommendations on youth livelihood funds” during the review of the policy but “tends to ignore” other recommendations*⁴³, such as on holding the national dialogue. Equally, there is limited uptake of issues raised to enhance civic competence. “For example commitment to civic education through the Uganda Human Rights Commission is limited. Human Rights Violations by security agencies continue despite the fact that the UHRC tables the issues annually in parliament. Citizens’ participation in the legislative process, through the right to petition, is limited. And many other cases...”⁴⁴

This raises important observations about government embracing citizen-focused issues. For instance, during the 2017/2018 budget, the Commission received total funding of UGX 22,670,000,000 billion (twenty-two billion, six hundred seventy million shillings only), 85% of this from government and 15% from donor agencies.⁴⁵ The Commission has called upon government, specifically the finance ministry “to

⁴⁰ See, for instance: Ramathan Ggoobi & Daniel Lukwago, 2020. *An Analysis of the Draft National Budget Estimates for FY 2020/21 and Proposals for Re-allocation*. Kampala: ACODE Policy Research Paper Series No. 97 (accessed from <https://www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/PRS97.pdf>, 22 Oct. 2020)

⁴¹ Roger Tangri & Andrew M. Mwenda, 2008, “Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda”, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 46 (2):177-194

⁴² SEAS 2

⁴³ SEAS 11

⁴⁴ SEAS 12

⁴⁵ These include: Democratic Governance Facility (DGF); Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS); German Cooperation for International Development (GIZ); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); and United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UHRC, 2018. *The 21st Annual Report, 2018*. Kampala: UHRC, p. XXV

address the recurring underfunding of the Commission."⁴⁶ During the in the financial year (FY) 2016/2017, the Commission received UGX 19.234 billion (Nineteen billion, two hundred and thirty-four million only), UGX 13.801 billion of which was from Government of Uganda and UGX 5.433 billion from development partners. Due to this, the Commission, among others, called upon the finance ministry to "implement the president's directive to fully fund the UHRC to avoid donor dependency."⁴⁷ During 2016, the Commission was funded to a tune of UGX 20.6 billion. Of this, UGX 13.8 billion was Government funding (67%); while UGX 6.8 billion was development-partner funding (33%). Compared to UGX 14.68 billion received in FY 2014/15, this was an increase in funding of 34%, but was "against a budget of UGX 27 billion leaving a funding gap of UGX 6.4 billion" unfunded. In other word, notwithstanding the increase in funding, the UHRC still remained underfunded.⁴⁸ With these recurrent funding gaps and repeated calls for more funding and budget/resource allocation to the Commission, it comes as no surprise that the Commission has not been able to establish sufficient sub-national structures (such as at district and sub-county levels) for undertaking CE.

3.5 Citizen-Focussed Issues taken on by Government

Governments receive and process issues from various sources. The processing of these issues inform policy and practice of government, because politics is a system of personal behaviour and institutions in which the state (acting through government) is *the major* but not the only actor. Government embodies the state's decision-making structure at a given time, but the state can be above and independent of government. Thus, citizen-focused issues may be channelled through state structures, such as bureaucracies and security agencies, or directly to the state's specific decision-making agency at a time, generally known as Government. Since the state encompasses more than government agencies, such as Cabinets, Legislatures and political appointees⁴⁹, it is possibly a more appropriate actor to engage in pursuit of citizen-focused issues.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. XXVI

⁴⁷ Including DGF, and the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS); as well as development partners' funding for specific activities by: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), the French Embassy, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UHRC, 2017, *The 20th Annual Report, 2017*. Kampala: UHRC, pp. XXIX-XXX

⁴⁸ UHRC, 2016. *The 19th Annual Report to the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda*. Kampala: UHRC, p. XXXIV

⁴⁹ David Easton, 1981, "The Political System Besieged by the State", *Political Theory* , 9(3):303-325

Citizen-focussed issues are those issues that reflect the ordinary citizen's interests, instead of elites' preferences. Issues like land rights, food and nutrition security, access to social services (health, education, water and sanitation, rural infrastructure, extension services), safety and security, are more citizen-focused than, say, capital markets, stock-market trading, or importation of luxury cars and other consumables. Some informants believe that Uganda's government has not prioritised citizen-focused issues, such as building civic agency, land rights protections, and food and nutrition security.⁵⁰ Informants insist that neglect of citizen-focused issues is commonplace because: (i) the government is beholden to an elitist state, and the governance system has been besieged by the state in theory and practice, rendering the contribution of non-state actors marginal⁵¹; (ii) both government and the state have been ensnared by incumbent actors who are disinterested in citizen-focused governance, as does happen in situations where incumbents have to negotiate costs and benefits of staying in office leading to unique configurations of state capture⁵²; and (iii) arising from (i) and (ii), both the state and government have relegated civic education, rendering it fragmentary and incoherent. While all state ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) have budget components on public education named variously, none has been effective in educating the masses on a range of issues, including MDAs that have sub-national reach, such as Internal Affairs, Education & Sports, Health, Local Government and Agriculture. For instance, the Covid-19 Response Strategy, specifically the *Nutrition Guidance for the General Population in the Context of COVID-19*, has not been adequately popularised to enable the Ugandan citizenry acquire nutrition-based resilience against Covid-19.⁵³ Underlying this concern is the apparent prioritisation of periphery issues in a country lacking basic

⁵⁰ A corollary of the apparent neglect of food and nutrition security in Uganda is this: by 2017, 26% of Uganda's population faced stressed food insecurity, An estimated 10.9 million people experienced acute food insecurity, of which 1.6 million (5%) were in a crisis situation. Republic of Uganda, 2017, *Report of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Analysis for Uganda*, Kampala: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

⁵¹ Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State".

⁵² Anna Grzymala-Busse, 2008, "Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation", *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (4/5):638-673

⁵³ Ministry of Health (MoH) (2020). *Nutrition Guidance for the General Population in the Context of COVID-19 in Uganda*, Kampala: MoH; Rwengabo, Sabastiano (2020). *Covid-19 in Uganda: Toward a National Strategy on Complex Public Health Emergencies*. Kampala: Konrad Adeneur Stiftung (from <https://www.kas.de/documents/280229/8800435/NCPHE+Strategy.pdf/937745e4-0e27-954d-5481-5b0d8b46fb1c?t=1588673770193>, 3 August 2020)

socio-development needs, including building national consciousness. On this complex issue, one informant stated:

“....But we have misplaced priorities which do not touch the core of citizens. This means their participation was not effective due to citizen capacity. Citizens do not know how to interact with government leaders at different levels. Our literacy levels are low: ask yourself: Why is civic competence improving in northern and north-eastern Uganda compared to central and southern Uganda? It is because war brought in CSOs (o empowerment, human rights, relief services, rehabilitation) and camps allowed easy access. Peaceful regions have a lot of laissez-faire and NGO engagement is still low. The state's involvement in CE is narrow, selfish, and only in form of Mchaka-Mchaka: what was its intention? The government needed more cadres, a mass of servants thinking and acting according to government's opinions. When that number was reached, Mchaka-Mchaka was stopped. If the intention had been national, there would be branches at sub-county level or in every district doing the same role as Kyankwanzi does. There is no deliberate effort to do it on a continuous basis...”⁵⁴

This long quotation needs no elaboration. It underscores the perceived neglect of civic education; the selfish interests informing limited civic education; and the unintended consequence of non-state interventions, in terms of civic awareness, in areas afflicted by civil strife. In keeping with constitutional obligations, the government has tried to uphold the principles of peace and security. Seeming emancipatory programs, such as mass immunisation, education for all, and others, have been tried. The unexplained murders in Kampala metropolitan area have reduced due to government response to the public outcry about insecurity.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, interviewees insist,

(“...the notion [that] power belongs to the people isn't being respected by the government.” Citizen issues about political and socio-economic injustices, or those that are likely to alter government's intended direction are not being taken. Only those issues that “translate into political and electoral capital, in terms of token support for the incumbent, are being taken on...”⁵⁶)

⁵⁴ KII, Kampala, UPIMAC/CECU Secretariat, 4th March 2020.

⁵⁵ SEAS 2

⁵⁶ Ibid

In other word, this admixture of responses makes it difficult to assess whether or not the government can be categorised as “responsive” or “non-responsive” to its citizenry. “...It is not clear whether government is satisfied with the work, but whenever government is asked their answer is always the same: ‘we have developed the policy and legal regime that is conducive to gender equality...’ But that is not enough”. On some issues, some legislations are reluctantly made only to be ignored: “there is a very big problem with implementation” of laws on sexual harassment, domestic violence, equal opportunities, and the other “very nice laws that government makes” in response to citizen demands.⁵⁷ Given this mixture, levels of government accountability to its citizens are clearly limited.

In terms of accountability, the same problem obtains because many of the issues dealt with are not citizen-focused and openness is wanting.

(“...Take the case of Covid-19 interventions: if citizens are to be the focus then there should be openness at every stage and feedback as a form of accountability....”⁵⁸)

Thus, in spite of the impressive legal, policy and institutional framework, public accountability is not sufficiently reflected on the ground. “Participation of the citizen”, in the design of other issues, “is still limited and there are several challenges with current representation and consultation arrangements.”⁵⁹ When government policies and strategies are not representative of people’s interests, the notion of democratic policymaking escapes through the window. Thus, while Ugandans appear to be ‘represented’ in structures like Parliament and Local Government Councils, the decision-making process remains detached from the people and is more of an elitist one than a citizen-focused policy environment.

Elitism and public policy

The elite theory of democracy asserts that elites are more strongly committed to democratic values, such as political tolerance, than are ordinary citizens, because elites are susceptible to political socialisation, re-socialisation, political practice, and acquired experience. These processes, it is argued, force elites to

⁵⁷ KII, SEAS 6, 9th March 2020

⁵⁸ SEAS 12

⁵⁹ SEAS 8

practice and embrace political tolerance.⁶⁰ The inherent assumption in this theory is that elites have mutable interests that can be modified by socialisation, exposure, and experience. Perhaps experiences of regular elections make elites realise that democracy is not problematic.⁶¹

Uganda's elites, however, tend to sideline processes and practices that would empower the citizenry. Democratic agenda setting depends on an empowered citizenry who can both claim and enjoy their rights. Some of the processes are civic education and civil society engagements with the state on civil and political issues. During the 2011 and 2016 elections, for instance, political elites "mostly ignored citizen concerns", and "the citizen's compact was ignored including the [proposed amendments of the] critical electoral laws..."⁶² Thus, civil society attempt to further the democratic ethos in Uganda, by engaging political elites, may have been relegated to the dustbin of policy due to narrow elite interests.

Public policies in Uganda, therefore, are inherently narrow-elite policies. The democratic frontage typical of these processes is but a mere façade. According to one informant, "Uganda is not a democracy. "We tend to view the government as a group that is intent at democratic principles, values, elections, and rights, but we are wrong. That's a wrong assumption." Lacking democratic intents and principles, government uses the pretensions of democracy to buy legitimacy. Duped by these pretences, intellectuals ask problematic, wrong, misplaced and/or misguided questions about democratic decision making because government is deceptive about its intentions. While semblances of freedoms may be apparent, such as allowing few people to hold radio and television talk-shows, the same government stops political leaders from accessing and talking on sub-national radio [and TV] stations after realising that national channels are accessible to very few urban based citizens.⁶³

The informant further revealed that some leading opposition politicians are only allowed to speak on TV and Radio stations that are based only in Kampala. They, however, are not allowed to easily appear on upcountry stations which ordinarily reach many rural Ugandan voters. Because the Kampala-based stations, which

⁶⁰ James L. Gibson & Raymond M. Duch, 1991, "Elitist theory and political tolerance in Western Europe", *Political Behaviour*, 13: 191–212

⁶¹ Lindberg, *Op cit*

⁶² SEAS 11

⁶³ KII, Kampala, 3rd March 2020

opposition politicians are allowed to use, can only reach at most 2 million voters, much less at the very time that these politicians may appear, the audience of alternative policy views is shrunk and democratic debate and exchange of ideas curtailed. This indicates, according to the informant, that the political leadership in government seeks to limit alternative views to only the small portion of the urban population, leaving the rural and majority open to government manipulation. Accordingly, the relevant question about democratic decision making in Uganda should change from *What's government doing to protect Ugandans' rights?*, to "What are citizens doing to reclaim their citizen and political agency?"⁶⁴

3.6 Satisfaction with CBR Support in Enhancing Civic Engagement.

A critical element of this survey was the assessment of the satisfaction of IPs with CBR's support to those CSOs that are involved in civic education. This support took the form of capacity building, knowledge generation and dissemination, monthly engagements on civic education, and exchanges between CBR and IPs. Most IPs were satisfied with CBR's work despite its short span:

("...I am satisfied with the CBR strategy of knowledge generation and dissemination through dialogues. I only think outreach of CBR is still limited..."⁶⁵)

Another informant revealed:

("...CBR is good enough and doing a noble job but can we have many of CBR [kinds of intervention] through supporting other CSOs to work in concert. At the level of satisfaction, I give CBR 4/5..."⁶⁶)

Satisfaction is more gauged in relation to the nature of work CBR is doing—knowledge production and dissemination and stakeholder engagement—than with civic education itself.

It was not lost to the informants that CBR's work has limited reach and influence beyond the IPs and research community. While this specific intervention was both timely and relevant, it lacked extensiveness and wide reach.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ SEAS 12

⁶⁶ SEAS 1

(“...let it be extensive and widespread to many Ugandans and let there be a platform for [more regular and in-depth] interaction with civil society organisations...”⁶⁷)

This is not dissimilar from the observation that

(“...Let CBR ensure that civic education reaches the common man so as to empower them to begin articulating civic matters such as public policy and others...”⁶⁸)

Calls “upon CBR to decentralise its efforts and empower more CSOs that reach the grassroots to drive it deeper to the population”⁶⁹ may sound like demanding too much from CBR, which by nature does not focus on civic education. Within these calls, however, lies the urge to conduct civic education beyond the urban environment and the intelligentsia to empower more ordinary Ugandans with civic competences to meaningfully participate in democratic decision making.

Despite the foregoing expressions of desire for a more citizen-focused intervention in civic education, informants and respondents were satisfied with CBR’s work in supporting civic education, through Monthly Expert Seminars. 100% of respondents revealed that these seminars were “very informative”. This resonates with positive responses from interview respondents, who suggested that CBR’s scientific analysis of civic education in Uganda was crucial. The Centre’s approach of evidence based civic education was considered to be consistent with the Constitution, the second National Development Plan (NDP-II), Vision 2040, and other national policies and strategies.⁷⁰ In other word, CBR was doing a commendable job of mainstreaming civic education across various areas, and was capacitating different actors by crafting an empirical document that can be used by the different institutions which take up the responsibility of enhancing access civic education among Ugandans: “CBR has been instrumental in providing academic ground on the already existing body of knowledge on civic education for many civil society members...”⁷¹

⁶⁷ SEAS 11 and SEAS 9

⁶⁸ SEAS 7

⁶⁹ SEAS 2

⁷⁰ SEAS 1

⁷¹ SEAS 2


While the Centre “is not yet in people’s faces”, it stands at the interstice between research and societal realities. This is based on three reasons. First, Uganda as a country still lags behind in terms of civic competences due to limited civic education. On a scale of 0-100, in terms of CE, the informant insisted, Uganda is still at about 30% of the journey. Second, CBR’s work may be positive but has yet to push CSOs that have previously been involved in CE but which had failed to meet ideals of a civically competent citizenry: “CBR is on course”, but has yet to properly direct the Civic Education Coalition of Uganda (CECU) on where civic educators in Uganda are going in terms of delivery on specific aspects of CE. CECU members understand the task at hand. They appreciate the weaknesses within the CE spectrum and delivery mechanisms. But CECU members have not been consistent because donors possibly fear political fallout from their overt and direct engagement on sensitive CE matters, either out of political correctness or in keeping with understanding between donors and government that civil society may not be privy to. As a result, consistent and in-depth engagements on the future of CE, the development and implementation of the CE curriculum, the methods and priorities in CE, and actors [that should be] involved, receive inadequate support. This explains why some of the national crises, such as land crises, persist due to limited CE.⁷²

Finally, research centres like CBR have yet to bridge the gap between academics and society. The need for bridging is dire because, the informant revealed, universities are no longer spaces for intellectual debate, reflection, and exchange of competing opinions—universities have relegated society and CBR should reclaim that space of academics in public discoursing. One way of bridging this gap, the informant offered, is to use the Centre’s intellectual resources to influence public opinion.⁷³

⁷² KII, UPIMAC/CECU, Kampala, 4th March 2020.

⁷³ KII, Uganda National N.G.O Forum, 3rd March 2020.

Figure 3: Relevancy of CBR Expert Seminar Themes



From figure 3, a total of 94% of expert seminar participants revealed that CBR's expert seminars are relevant to current issues. This means that seminars focused more on contemporary issues than on general issues related to civic education. This was especially so with seminars that may be more historical or related to less direct themes and issues like national identity and dialogue. Another 6% noted that CBR seminars need to connect more directly with civic education.


This minority opinion was also supported by findings from key informant interviews, which reveal that: (i) CBR should provide a “Ugandan Definition of CE.” The provision of “conceptual clarity” on CE in Uganda will enable CE actors to determine the themes and priorities of CE. (ii) CBR should provide guidance on methods, stakeholders, and how to engage them: should CE target only citizens or do not government leaders and intellectuals also need CE. (iii) CBR's support to CE actors with research on the effective methods of delivering CE will enable actors to undertake evidence-based CE and help them answer such questions as. What nature of CE are we undertaking? How to we deliver it? (iv) While CBR has rekindled the importance of evidence-based CE, a comparative analysis of CE in different countries, underlining the practices of different countries (e.g. South Korea, Tanzania, Singapore), is still lacking, yet this would enrich the content and empirical capacity of civic educators. (v) The use of information technology to enhance in-house and partners' technical capacity to enrich their understanding of CE, and the context which determines the messages delivered during CE, is still lacking. This affects both the timing and other issues that might be considered when designing CE interventions. (vi) Projections into the future

remain inadequate and/or inadequate at CBR, which renders partners unable to prepare for changing times. “Technologies, demographics, social identities and classes, values are all changing: what will CE be like in 30, 50, 100 years?...”⁷⁴

There was general satisfaction with keynote speakers that CBR selected for Expert Seminars. 100% of respondents revealed that the keynote speakers selected for the various seminars were “very knowledgeable”, in their field of expertise. This indicates carefulness during selection of keynote speakers.

Aside from the relevant themes and knowledgeable keynote speakers, the benefits accruing from expert seminars (to the participants) are an important indicators of satisfaction with these interventions. Participants were asked about their major take homes from the seminars—the benefits, albeit intellectual and not practical—that arose from these seminars. The “key take-home message(s)” from monthly expert seminars are useful for gauging what participants believe they benefited from the activity. While this was an open question, 87% noted that civic education is a collective responsibility of all citizens (fig. 4). Further, 65% of respondents noted, civic education is a collective responsibility that across all sectors.

Figure 4: Key Take-Home Messages from Expert Seminars



⁷⁴ KII, UPIMAC/CECU, Kampala, 4th March 2020

On the general impact of the various Monthly Expert Seminars on individual participants (*civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic dispositions*), 67% of respondents noted that the monthly expert seminars increased their understanding of good governance and democracy (Civic knowledge), with another 27% revealing that the seminars made them more capacitated (Fig. 5).

Figure 5: Seminars' Impact on Civic Knowledge





Figure 6: Impact of Expert Seminars on Civic Skills



As revealed in Figure 6, 42% of respondents stated that expert seminars improved on their skills in advocacy and policy influence. A significant 33% revealed that expert seminars improved their networking skills, whilst 8% across communication, mobilization and research skills of respondents were impacted.

Figure 7: Impact of Expert Seminars on Civic Dispositions




Figure 7, reveals an indeterminate influence on civic disposition, when measured in terms of knowledge, pragmatism, and role of citizenships. 70% revealed that the role of a citizen comes out strongly as an important aspect of civic education, while a significant 20% that their knowledge disposition improved.

The foregoing findings reveal that the IPs as well as participants in CBR seminars were generally satisfied with CBR's work. There is general satisfaction with the broad intervention involving research, dissemination, capacity building, and monthly interfaces on civic education. There is also commendable levels of satisfaction with specific aspects of the interventions, such as revealed on specified aspects of expert seminars. This indicates that CBR's work has been a timely and relevant intervention not only in building capacity of IPs but also in creating an environment for regular discussions on civic education that may have trickle down effects on civic education generally and civic competences, in particular, of those who participate and others around them. These findings, therefore, underscore the challenge of tailoring disparate, multi-actor efforts to address the question of democratic agenda setting in Uganda.

It is worth acknowledging that CBR's intervention on CE, despite a short time-span, has managed to attract, and bring on board, critical state institutions. The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF); the National Leadership Institute (NALI), Kyankwanzi; and the Uganda Police Force (UPF), and Ministry of National Guidance, have been actively engaging with civilian sectors under the auspices of CBR. This is ground-breaking in several respects: first, because all previous encounters have been limited to instances when there is a security problem to be solve; second, these institutions tend to address sensitive national issues; and third, because the configuration of the project would have been inadequate to attract these institutions within a short time but for pre-existing good working relations. Similarly, political party leaders, and leaders of the Buganda kingdom, have, through the expert seminars, widened their reach and interaction with intellectuals, in ways not very common before. This stakeholder engagement process may have sown seeds of future partnerships with these institutions in ways that may have positive impacts on processes of CE.

4. CBR Interventions and the Challenge of Democratic Agenda Setting

Interventions to build civic competencies require resources and power. CBR may have some intellectual power, but not resource and political power. In reality, more powerful, resourced actors are more likely to define the civic education agenda than less powerful actors. In comparison, therefore, governmental agencies and more resourced non-governmental actors can influence civic education agenda setting than would CBR, through such tools as the internet and media engagement. In the process, such actors can have their ideas prevail over those of less powerful actors. These agendas of the more powerful, then, may affect the gender, generational, and social-class aspects of civic engagement in public life.⁷⁵ In order to make sense of this view, focus in this section is on CBR's specific interventions in research, capacity building, and expert seminars.

4.1 Research Interventions

CBR is a research institution. Much of its work has previously been basic research, with applied research recently evolving. The benefit of applied research is that it

⁷⁵ Delli Carpini, M. X., 2000, 'Youth, Civic Engagement, and the New Information Environment. *Political Communication*, 17 (4):341-349;

can be useable and useful to practitioners on specific issues. Key informant interviews revealed that “.....the researches undertaken by CBR on CE provided the much needed evidence that is crucial for understanding, planning, programming and evaluating CE in Uganda. UHRC has the constitutional mandate on civic education, so research and documentation of civic education matters is of interest [to UHRC and other actors]...”⁷⁶ This reveals that in terms of agenda setting, CBR’s research products have invaluable contribution if tailored to the needs of the more powerful and mandated actors in CE.

Sometimes, specific competencies need to be linked with other opportunities to realise impact. While CBR’s research has potential to reach wider audiences, the link between its work and the young generation has not been bridged. Intentional reliance on university students to avail information at CBR to the general public will be critical for CE in the long-term: “....CBR needs to utilise its Researchers’ reach to university students and utilise these resources to break down its research products and make them accessible and useful. This can be done to ensure that students are used to expose research products via their social media channels, and in the process lots of things can be made available to the world. Since lecturers who are researchers at CBR can access these students, there is need to be more intentional with these students...”⁷⁷ This novelty indicates that the potential for dissemination is greater than CBR may have realised, highlighting the need to bridge the generational, dissemination, and outreach gap by fusing evidence with student-teacher engagements at university level.

The final aspect of research interventions is to work with young people. This can be achieved by: deepening research capacity; asking legitimate [and relevant] questions; and enriching young people’s understanding of Uganda’s conflicting interests. An equally important approach is to “democratise the knowledge in order to get it to the people who need it”, as opposed to shelving it for only high-end readers. The simplification of research findings and then use of post-modern ICT and students to disseminate it has been recommended. The engagement of other stakeholders and audiences would also serve to enrich societal knowledge and understanding of what is available about CE.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ SEAS 8

⁷⁷ FGD, Wizarts Foundation, Kampala, 3rd March 2020

⁷⁸ FGD, Wizarts Foundation, Kampala, 3rd March 2020

All these interventions enhance citizen agency by taking information to the people: “How does this information get to the people? It shouldn’t be in the library” but has to get out of the library) and into people’s minds. It has been suggested that “The CBR library should be digitised and availed to other DGF partners; that is: CBR should prioritise, digitise, and let its partners know what the Centre has or has produced, show other partners the information it has in order to add value and enhance their effectiveness.” In the process, CBR can build partnerships that benefit the Centre, a move that will be possible when CBR has a clear objective in mind that drives these partnerships.⁷⁹ In other word, research interventions can enrich democratic agenda setting when they inform and enrich stakeholder partnerships and engagements that have mutual benefits for both the Centre and other CE actors.

4.2 Capacity Building Interventions

Capacity-building measures can be helpful in enriching the mandated activities of different actors. When mandated actors are capacitated, their enriched and enhanced interventions in Ce and similar activities can have significant positive impact in democratic agenda setting: they sow seeds of informed citizen participation. The IPs acknowledge that CBR’s capacity-building interventions can help in informing policy recommendations to government on CE. The Centre can also provide research support to other organisations that reach sub-national levels of civic engagement. Therefore, CBR’s support to other organisations drives civic education to the grass root levels if the Centre enables those community levels partners to undertake bottom-up CE.⁸⁰

A second aspect of capacity building interventions is sustainability. One informant insisted that CBR needs to develop a long-term perspective tailored toward prioritised interventions with stakeholders in order to cushion itself from future exigencies.

*(“...Build a sustainability strategy. Identify core interventions, because some events are calendrical and others are long-term. Seek sustainable funding sources. Develop **conceptual clarity** on what is intended or desired in CE. Create cushions around funding fluctuations....”⁸¹)*

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ SEAS 2

⁸¹ KII, Uganda National N.G.O Forum, Kampala, 3rd March 2020.

These strategic priorities and cushions, if designed with the view to furthering long-term interventions in building civic competencies for participatory governance, will enable the Centre to avoid challenges of abandoning CE interventions in a country which still needs serious work to build its civic capacity for democratic agenda setting.

It was also recommended that CBR can not only utilise and but also scale up their academic capacity to generate a bigger intellectual power bank. This resource bank would then enable continuous and systematic interpretation of core elements of CE in keeping with the laws and political context of Uganda. This can then become the basis for developing a national CE agenda. The agenda, therefore, can become a kind of strategic blue-print for building a foundation for democratic agenda setting in a changing world. This institutionalisation of CE processes enables the country to build an institutional framework for social mobilisation and adaptation to changing political environs.⁸²

Another element of democratic agenda setting, today, is the effective use of social media

(“...to make civic education information reach many consumer groups, basically the [duty] bearers...”⁸³)

According to this view, social media is the space of access not only for young generations, but will increasingly become a space for engaging multiple actors readily and cheaply. This widens the dissemination of research findings on CE, as well as sharing of targeted formats for different stakeholders. This can complement preparations of evidence-based policy briefs to share research findings with policy makers/government. Possibly, CBR's joining the lobbying efforts for a National Civic Education Policy might be kick-started with policy briefs.⁸⁴ The absence of a policy on CE, if true, indicates the government's lackadaisical attention to CE over the years. Evidence-based engagements of government on such an important policy document would be sowing seeds of

⁸² SEAS 1. Also see: Samuel P. Huntington, 1968, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press; Karl W. Deutsch, 1961, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *The American Political Science Review*, 55 (3):493-514

⁸³ SEAS 7

⁸⁴SEAS 8

governance frameworks on the basis of which government may be held accountable on issues of democratic agenda setting.

4.3 Expert Seminars

Expert seminars played key roles in underlining the challenge of democratic agenda setting through citizen participation. First, they exposed the paucity of policy consistency and political will on civic education for democracy. This became more apparent when the different seminars revealed serious gaps in the relationship between what the constitution provides under Chapter 4 and what government has been doing over the years, superficially since the establishment of the Uganda Human Rights Commission in 1997.

Second, the Seminars revealed the generational disconnect that places a more civically-aware older generation before the relatively less civically-aware younger generation despite the advantages of post-modern ICT. This implies that governmental and non-governmental actors alike have not had the conceptual and operational clarity on how to engage Ugandans on critical issues of national importance whereby CE would have been a core element of such undertakings. Some of the issues, such as national language, patriotism, national values, and national priorities, have been as contentious as they remain unclear. The seminars, if continued, have potential to expose these gaps in the national consciousness, which has important ramifications for generating debate on democratic engagements on these same issues.

Finally, the seminars provided an opportunity for interaction between state and non-state actors, allowing for open discussion wherein government weaknesses and challenges could be appreciated. This furthered the culture of open and honest engagement between state and non-state actors, which provided a starting point for underlining the core issues that actors in CE should prioritise in order to build a citizenry that is capable of meaningful participation in democratic agenda setting. While the seminars themselves do not constitute an agenda-setting platform, they provided opportunity for learning on the same.

4.4 Interventions vs. CBR Mandate

While respondents and key informants highlighted some of the gaps in and weaknesses with CBR's work, some raised these weaknesses in the broader context of CE in Uganda. CBR, being a research centre, neither has mandate to conduct CE across the country nor the obligation to pressure state and non-state

actors to do so. Therefore, CBR can only “support partners to conduct action-oriented research on civic-education-related issues”⁸⁵, beyond which it plays merely a supplementary, not active, role in civic education. While CBR seminars may have created a platform for “advancing broader goals of civic education in Uganda”⁸⁶, CBR may only indirectly support actual civic education through research, capacity building and convenings.

CBR’s convening power is an important opportunity for periodically causing multiple actors to reflect upon civic education and its implications for Uganda’s democratic trajectory. Perhaps CBR can also observe the work of IPs in order to tailor its capacity-building interventions to the observed realities of undertaking CE in rural Uganda. Observation research may provide such an opportunity. One informant had this to say:

(“...CBR is on the right track, but they need to up their game. After 2 years of learning ...we can provide an opportunity to CBR to travel upcountry and witness first-hand how CE is undertaken in the countryside...”⁸⁷)

Such experiential approach to capacity building may enable CBR to design novel interventions that may make IPs more effective actors in CE.

Finally, capacity building is dependent upon continuous growth on the part of the capacity builder. CBR, in addition to widening and deepening its capacity, needs peer learning from IPs. This is useful for two reasons. First, CBR is opening new areas, raising new ideas, ways and concepts, about CE. These intellectual and empirical formulations generate new challenges for civic educator IPs, which may require reflection and refinement. Second, some of the conceptual formulations are best raised with highly educated people, but may not be appropriate or easy with illiterates and semi-illiterates. Peer learning enables CBR and other IPs on how to package some messages in order to strengthen the capacity of citizens to engage more meaningfully on complex concepts and issues as democracy.

Finally, everyone needs CE, including CBR personnel themselves. Circumstances change. Very fast, especially in an ICT era. Therefore, even “the professors need CE].” Perhaps enhanced capacity in multi-stakeholder engagement may enable

⁸⁵ SEAS 9

⁸⁶ SEAS 12

⁸⁷ KII, UPIMAC/CECU, Kampala. 4th March 2020

CBR to build “lasting relationships with organisations which can utilise its knowledge...”⁸⁸ For example, under conditions of Covid-19, public activities are restricted. Human engagements have become more electronified. CBR’s ability to adapt to new media and technologies to conduct research, build capacity, and strengthen its own means of delivery, may depend on its own institutional learning and adaptability. Covid-19 may alter the ways in which we conduct civic education, research about it and build capacity of those undertaking it. These changing circumstances and demands also imply that CBR needs continuous learning and adaptive in-house capacity building.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Concluding summary of Findings and Analysis

This Satisfaction Survey was undertaken to assess the extent to which the project “*Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda*”, met its intended objectives. It was an end-of-project investigation to assess the satisfaction of project beneficiaries, vis-à-vis CBR and DGF interventions under the project. The findings reveal general satisfaction, among DGF implementing partners (IPs), with CBR work of research, information dissemination, and expert seminars, on civic education. While there is general dissatisfaction with the extent to which government upholds citizens’ rights, specifically the right to access to justice, respect for the socioeconomic and welfare rights of the poor and marginalised, and the right to hold state agencies accountable, some of the issues raised by DGF partners tend to be taken on by government despite implementation lapses that render government less responsive and less citizen-centred.

Most IPs are satisfied with CBR’s capacity-building intervention and appreciate the conceptual clarity it is providing on the rather complex subject of civic education. They were also considerate about the limits of time and resources used to undertake these interventions. Specifically, the training/capacity building provided to IPs was satisfactory in enhancing their knowhow and capacity to conduct some research, design projects, engage beneficiaries and partners more meaningfully, and enrich the content and quality of their interventions. Information dissemination and stakeholder engagement activities, specifically

⁸⁸ Ibid.

monthly expert seminars, provided important opportunities to participate, learn, and develop conceptual clarity about some of the central questions and issues about civic education in Uganda.

There are concerns that CBR's civic education debates and discussions are limited to urban areas and reach few media houses, making the process less accessible to rural and unschooled Ugandans. The monthly expert seminars underscored the crucial role of the media in civic education and multi-stakeholder engagements, though it appears CBR had not been deliberate with the media as a means of supporting broader audiences and making its research products accessible and useable to wider audiences. CBR's need to engage the media cannot be overemphasized; the media retains public trust, in a context where many state and non-state *organisations institutions face a credibility crisis*. The media will enable CBR to operate beyond the traditional "write it down, put it in a book, put it in the library" approach. Similarly, time-bound interventions, such as CBR/DGF two-year project, are limited in their ability to build lasting capacity of IPs and support civic education, because these needs require continuous, ceaseless, interventions and processes running for at least 10 years.

5.2 Recommendations

1. **Plan and execute longer-term interventions beyond this project:** CBR, DGF, and IPs, should work together and build a long-term sustainability strategy to continue with these interventions beyond the project lifespan. This can entail seeking more sustainable funding, developing and implementing an M&E plan for the long term, simplifying the research findings to make them easy to consume, and crafting more stakeholders' interest in Ce research and debates over the longer term.
2. **Bring Media at Centre of Expert Seminars:** DGF and CBR should prioritise strengthening expert seminars as spaces for uncensored interaction between the State and non-state actors, and work with media houses to enhance visibility and participation in the seminars.
3. **Media-engagement Strategy:** CBR should develop and implement a media-engagement and partnership strategy that will enhance its visibility, while making its findings on CE available and useable to wider publics.
4. **Simplify and disseminate research findings:** CBR and DGF should work together to identify which aspects of the research on civic education can be simplified into products that are easily consumed by policy makers, general public, and appropriate channels of dissemination utilised.

5. **Observe IPs' work:** CBR should undertake field observations of IPs which undertake civic education in rural areas, in order to enrich the Centre's grasp of the challenges and modalities of undertaking civic education in rural Uganda.
6. **Continuous learning and capacity building:** Both CBR and IPs need to develop institutional learning and adaptation strategies in order to enable themselves cope with unpredictable circumstances, such as Covid-19, which may have adverse impact on their work.
7. **Continue with Seminars:** Beyond the project, Expert Seminars seem to have become important platforms for free intellectual exchanges in a context where university debates have dwindled considerably. Considering the mentioned benefits of these seminars to participants, their continuity is an important contribution to national intellectual development.
8. **Simplify, Package, Make Research easy to Use:** CBR's research team should develop and utilise capacity to simplify, package, and market its knowledge into simple knowledge products like policy briefs, technical briefs, info-sheets, infographics, calls-to-action papers, video clips, online posts and blogs, and fact-sheets. This will make CBR's work inform everyday choices of major governance actors within and outside the State.
9. **Innovate Conceptualisation and Interrogate Practices:** respondents call upon CBR to provide a "*Ugandan Conception of Civic Education*", by attempting conceptual clarity, innovative adaptations of CE to local contexts, and publishing such conceptual innovation. The Centre should also continue to interrogate the theory and practice of democracy in Uganda as political developments unfold: Is Uganda pursuing genuine democratisation or are these mere fallacious political choices meant to legitimise a regime that lacks democratic intents?
10. **Adapt to Changing Circumstances:** while CBR displayed adaptability by embracing more media engagements, it is not clear how its interventions might have been adapted to more unpredictable circumstances like Covid-19. The experience of this survey, which was compelled by Covid-19 lockdowns to rely on internet-based interviewing and questionnaire administration, shows that as the world embraces more of Industry 4.0 and Industry X systems and processes, CBR needs to speed up its adaptation and copying mechanisms, such as acquiring teleconferencing facilities and capacity, to avoid a technological lag.
11. **Go digital with e-library to ease access.** Whilst CBR has a rich resource collection of education resource materials, the centre should invest into

establishment of an online library for to enable anytime access of civic education materials. With the “new normal” of Covid-19 pandemic, CBR can collaborate with other civil society organisations and invest in the start of art studio for the expert seminars to be live online.

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Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Satisfaction Survey

1. Background

Centre for Basic Research (CBR) has since June 2018 been implementing a project titled: 'Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda'. The project which ends in December 2020 is supported by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF). The primary focus of the on-going project, premised on the assumption that civic education is one of the foundations upon which democracy thrives, is to produce, manage and disseminate knowledge in such a way that enables civic education stakeholders and practitioners pragmatically engage duty bearers and the citizenry to enhance democratic governance practices.

2. Research Studies

One of the strategies that has been pursued in implementing this project has been undertaking research on pertinent civic education thematic areas, analysing primary and secondary data generated and appropriately package and disseminate the findings of the various researches, via different kinds of publications, media events and activities tailored to inform democratic governance agendas and interventions by civil society engaged in civic education in general, and DGF Implementing Partners (IPs) in particular. This, it is hoped, will enhance citizen engagements with government at different levels, which strengthens democratic practices.

Ten desk studies on different thematic issues on civic education have so far been conducted, including the following:

1. Mapping of Organizations involved in civic education
2. Compilation of an annotated bibliography on civic education resources and materials
3. Research Study on the Research Capacity Training Needs Assessment of DGF IPs to inform Capacity Strengthening support to the IPs that was to be provided by CBR. The following organizations were interviewed by the researchers: African Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (ACTV); African Leadership Institute (ALI); Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO); Civic Response on Environment and Development (CRED); Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG); Council for African Policy (CAP); Human Rights Centre Uganda (HRC); Platform for Labour Action (PLA); Uganda Debt Network (UDN); Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC); Uganda Media Women's Association (UMWA); Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF); Uganda Women's Network (UWONET); Wizarts Foundation; Uganda Youth Network (UYONET); Uganda Project Implementation Management Centre (UPIMAC), and Restless Development.
4. Desk review of the theoretical literature on civic education relevant to Uganda

5. An Expert Analysis of the National Budget and funding priorities of government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)
6. Research Study on the National Civic Education Policy
7. Desk Review of the Civic Education Curriculum
8. Expert analysis of the national budget and funding priorities of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to understand the extent and implications of public investment in civic education in Uganda for the period 2011/12 to 2018/19
9. An Expert analysis of the national budget to understand the public financing of civic education and funding priorities of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in the FY2019/2020 National Budget
10. A review of the political context in the country in relations to how it is influencing civic education agendas by civil society undertaken in support of the Coalition on Civic Education in Uganda (CECU).
11. The Comprehensive Review of Civic Education in Uganda
12. Research study on 'identification of possible areas for Legislation on Civic Education in Uganda'

3. Monthly Expert Seminars on Civic Education

Monthly Expert Seminars on critical civic education issues in Uganda are an important avenue through which an attempt has been made at Centre for Basic Research to achieve a convergence between theories and the practices of civic education in Uganda in general. The Expert Seminars have provided opportunities for leading intellectuals and civic education practitioners to engage with emerging civic education issues to understand not only the contribution to the deepening of democratic governance discourse of the civic education that has been undertaken so far by state and non-state actors, its approaches, delivery mechanisms and impact, but also the intellectual debates on the appropriateness of the civic knowledge generated in which are embodied the country's core values and principles, on the basis of which civic competencies and dispositions can be nurtured.

The Monthly Expert Seminars provide an interactive platform for researchers, academics, policy makers and the general public to continue with the debates on the practical necessities of how civic education can become a better vehicle for providing citizens with the knowledge, skills and tools with which to enter the market place of ideas to engage in a deliberative process in which ideals of the democracy we desire are as a country are discussed openly and truthfully to generate minimum consensus on contested political and others issues that affect the country's democratic dispensations.

These Monthly Expert Seminars, therefore enable those who participate in them to think beyond their current political, occupational, intellectual and cultural dispositions in order to engage in critical inquiry into broader issues of the conceptualization of civic education from a nuanced understanding of the different interpretations of the country's history, the structural constraints in civic education pedagogy and andragogy, including its approaches and strategies as a way to understand how to do democracy in ways that strengthen citizen's civic skills and sense citizenship, even if this calls for doing it

differently. Monthly Expert Seminars are aimed at influencing the democratic governance processes by enhancing responsiveness of government to needs of citizens through continuous constructive dialogue and engagements based on citizen's enhanced understanding of the country's contemporary politics as informed by a correct appreciation of the various versions of its competing interpretations of its history.

As an intellectual undertaking, these Monthly Expert Seminars are Centre for Basic Research's quest to re-problematize the engagement of the democratic governance agenda in the country as undergirded by a nuanced understanding of civic education. The following Civic Education seminars have been held since June 2018:

1. The 1st Expert Seminar was held on July 26, 2018. The keynote address was delivered by the Chairperson of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) on the subject: *'The Challenges of Implementing Civic Education in Uganda'*.
2. The 2nd Monthly Expert Seminar was held on September 20, 2018 and focussed on discussions on Political tolerance following the violence in parts of the country in the wake of events that happened in the aftermath of the hotly contested Arua Municipality bye-elections titled: *'Condemn Bobi Wine's beating minus roughing up Bebe Cool: Civic education and Political Tolerance'*. It was delivered by Mr. Bernard Tabaire, the Director of Programmes at the Africa Centre for Media Excellence.
3. The 3rd Monthly Expert Seminar was held on October 30, 2018 and focussed on the topic: *'Refashioning Uganda's Political Dispensations: Civic Education and Building a Democratic Tradition'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Mr. Robert Kalundi-Serumaga, a media Consultant, Journalist, film maker and Cultural activist.
4. The 4th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on November 28, 2018 and focussed on the topic: *'The role of the Directorate of National Guidance in advancing the contribution of civic education to Uganda's democratic governance agenda'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Mr. Jonah Jackson Bakalikwira, Assistant Commissioner, National Guidance in the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance.
5. The 5th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on December 12, 2018 and focussed on the topic: *'The Ugandan Elite and Patriotism: What Can be done differently to build a stronger Democratic Tradition in Uganda'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Mrs. Beatrice Bananuka, the Assistant Commissioner, the National Secretariat for Patriotism Corps, Office of the President.
6. The 6th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on the January 31, 2019 and focussed on the topic: *'Civic Education Training for Leaders: The Role of the National Leadership Institute (NALI), Kyankwanzi'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Brigadier General Kasura Kyomukama, the Director of NALI.
7. The 7th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on February 28, 2019 and focussed on the topic: *'Understanding the Paradox of a Civic Deficit despite multitudes of Civic Education initiatives in Uganda: A Curriculum Perspective of Civic Education'*. The

keynote speech was delivered by Prof. Mwambutsya Ndebese, senior Lecturer, Makerere University and Research Fellow, Centre for Basic Research.

8. The 8th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on March 28, 2019 and focussed on the topic: *'Civic Education, National Integration and the Buganda Question: Reflections from the Book: 'Protection, Patronage or Plunder?'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Owek. Apollo Nelson Makubuya, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Attorney General, Buganda Kingdom.
9. The 9th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on April 25, 2019 and focussed on the topic: *'The Challenges of Contemporary Democratic Institutions, Traditions and Practices: What is the way-forward for Uganda?'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Rtd. Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu, Founding Chair, of the Interim Committee of the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT) Political Party, and former President, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).
10. The 10th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on May 30, 2019, and focussed on the topic: *'Participation and Engagement of Youths in furthering the Democratic Governance Agenda in Uganda'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Mr. John Ssenkumba, a Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Basic Research, and PhD Fellow at Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR).
11. The 11th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on June 28, 2019, and focussed on the topic: *'Enhancing Democratic Governance through Civic Education: A Comprehensive Review of the Nature, Drivers and Impact of Civic Education in Uganda'*. The keynote presentation was delivered by Dr. Frank Emmanuel Muhereza, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Basic Research, and Coordinator, Civic Education Project at CBR; Dr. Akim Okuni, an Education and Development Consultant, and a CBR Research Associate; and Mr. Emmanuel Mugole, a Social Development Consultant, and CBR Research Associate. The three constituted the National Synthesis Report writing team.
12. The 12th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on July 28, 2019, and focussed on the topic: *'Patriotism and Citizenship: Should Citizens be taught to be Patriotic, How and by Who'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga, the Executive Director, Centre for Basic Research.
13. The 13th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on August 29, 2019, and focussed on the topic: *'Making the Case for a Law on Civic Education in Uganda: Issues for Possible Consideration'*. The keynote speech was delivered by Dr. Phiona Muhwezi Mpanga, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Makerere University and Research Affiliate, Centre for Basic Research and Mr. John Ssenkumba, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Basic Research, and PhD Fellow at Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR).
14. The 14th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on September 24, 2019 on the topic: *'Nurturing a Patriotic Citizenry in Uganda: Examining the contribution of a compulsory National Youth Service Program'*. The keynote was delivered by Colonel Nelson Ahebwa of the Civil-Military Co-operation Department of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF).

15. The 15th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on 30 October 2019 on the topic: '*Civic Education, Democratic Practices and Economic Development: Defining an Agenda for Engagement in Uganda*'. The keynote was delivered by Dr. Fred Muhumuza, Lecturer, School of Economics, Makerere University.
16. The 16th Monthly Expert Seminar was held on 29 November 2019 on the topic: 'Why What Works is What Matters: Insights from Political Settlements in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania'. The keynote was delivered by Dr. Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi, Professor Extraordinarius at the Archie Mafeje Research Institute at the University of South Africa (UNISA), and Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the School of Environment and Development, Faculty of Humanities, University of Manchester (UK).
17. The 17th Monthly Expert Seminar is scheduled for December 13, 2019, and will focus on the topic: 'Youth Violence, Violent Extremism and Transnational Insecurity: The Case of Uganda'. The keynote will be delivered by Mr. Stephen Hippo Twebaze, Researcher, African Parliaments, and Senior Policy Analyst, Doctrines in Armed Forces and National Security Studies.

In this regard, CBR seeks to retain the services of a highly qualified resource person of repute with an intellectual capacity to undertake a survey of satisfaction with CBR project activities carried out among DGF beneficiary partners.

4. Objectives of the Satisfaction Survey Research

This survey of satisfaction with CBR project activities carried out among DGF beneficiary partners is intended to determine:

- (i) Level of satisfaction with government in upholding citizens' rights;
- (ii) Level of inclusion of key issues raised by DGF IPs in government decision making;
- (iii) Citizen focussed issues taken on by government;
- (iv) Level of satisfaction with CBR support in enhancing civic engagement.

5. Responsibilities of the Resource Person

The Resource Person shall carry out the following specific tasks:

1. Hold consultations with CBR Research Fellows who have been involved with (a) providing research capacity strengthening support to DGF IPs through providing them training on research; (b) Provision of technical backstopping support to DGF IPs, including Research Quality Assurance; support to DGF IPs in the development of policy briefs; support to DGF IPs in utilization of their existing research products, among

others. The aim of these consultation will be **to determine what kind of support was provided by Centre for Basic Research**, to which organizations, when and how; and with what outcomes and impacts.

2. Hold consultations with twelve (12) DGF Implementing Partners (IPs) with whom Centre for Basic Research signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) to collaborate in undertaking project activities under the DGF Civil Society Umbrella program, and determine the extent to which the objectives of these MoU had been accomplished, and with what outputs, outcomes and impacts.
3. Hold consultations with those twelve (12) DGF partners, as stated in (2.) above, that had received training, research and technical backstopping support to determine the extent of their satisfaction with the support received from Centre for Basic Research, as well as other activities that Centre for Basic Research has been involved in under the DGF Civil Society Umbrella program since June 2018.
4. The resource person will hold consultations with members of the steering committee of the Civic Education Coalition of Uganda (CECU) to assess the extent of contribution by Centre for Basic Research in advancing the broader goals of enhancing civic education in Uganda.
5. The resource person may also hold consultations with: Ministry of Information, Communication, Technology (ICT) and National Guidance (MICT&NG), and the National Secretariat for Patriotism Corps in the Office of the President, among others, to enrich the satisfaction research.
6. Amongst the respondents from partner organizations to be considered for interviews should include the following:
 - a. Persons who have received a copy of the Centre for Basic Research Book on 'Controlling Consent'
 - b. Persons who have received copies of other CBR Books and working papers
 - c. Persons who have visited CBR website over the past 12 months
 - d. Persons who have visited CBR premises at 15 Baskerville Avenue on official business
 - e. Persons who have visited the CBR Library and documentation centre
 - f. Persons who have read about, heard about media coverage on CBR project activities under the DGF project, including the different media platforms such as what' up, Facebook, Twitter, among others.
 - g. Persons who have been in contact with a staff or researcher from CBR by email, telephone or physically.
 - h. Persons who have attended CBR workshops on dissemination of research findings
 - i. Person who had attended and participated in CBR Monthly Expert Seminars on Civic Education.
 - j. Persons who had attended CBR Monthly Expert Seminars of Civic Education as either Keynote speakers or discussants.
7. For purposes of specificity, the Resource person will undertake the following specific activities:
 - a) Read and internalize the CBR Civic Education Technical proposal, as well as the Research Capacity Needs Assessment report, and Research Capacity Strengthening Support Concept Note, and other relevant documentation from the Civic Education project;

- b) Participate in developing a research instrument for the Satisfaction Survey of CBR project activities undertaken with twelve (12) DGF Implementing Partners (IPs);
- c) Hold consultations with two (02) selected respondents from the twelve (12) DGF IPs provided by CBR, on the basis of which the degree of satisfaction with CBR project activities will be determined;
- d) Analyze primary data collected from field survey (involving at least 24 respondents from 12 DGF IPs), and secondary data obtained from various sources related to the implementation of the DGF-funded CBR project titled: 'strengthening Evidence based democratic governance agenda setting and engagement by civil society in Uganda';
- e) Prepare a satisfaction survey/research report which shall be presented to a CBR Seminar that shall be convened specifically for that purpose.

In addition, the Resource Person shall carry out the following specific tasks:

- a) Prepare a Detailed Research Report that provides an analysis of the above issues on the basis of which satisfaction with CBR project activities can be based.
- b) Present the Research Report to a CBR Seminar which shall be convened specifically for the purpose of receiving the findings of the survey of satisfaction with CBR project activities funded by DGF
- c) Undertake revisions of the Research report to produce a final report for publication as a CBR Occasional Working Paper.
- d) Participate in media activities associated to this assignment, including granting interviews to journalists from Radio and television stations; appearing on their programs, as well as preparing materials for media dissemination.

The Resource Person will work closely with the CBR Civic Education Project Secretariat in order to accomplish the task above. The Secretariat will provide a list of twelve (12) DGF IPs with whom CBR has signed an MoU, persons to consult in those organisations, lists of participants who have been attending Monthly Expert Seminars, as well as other documents.

6. Remuneration

As full consideration of the services that will be provided by the Resource Person, Centre for Basic Research will pay a lump-sum of UGX 300,000 per working day (all other expenses inclusive), totalling UGX 6,000,000 only for 20 days, of which 6 per cent will be retained as Withholding Tax. An initial payment of 30 per cent will be made on signing the contract. The final instalment of 70 per cent will be paid at the final conclusion of the assignment after the delivery of an acceptable final report incorporating suggested

revisions. Centre for Basic Research will also pay for vehicle hire for fieldwork for 12 days at 350,000 per day totalling UGX. 4,200,000/=.

Appendix 2: List of DGF IPs that Participated in CBR Project Activities

1. Ministry of ICT and National Guidance

Jonah Jackson Bakalikwira, Assistant Commissioner, National Guidance

jobakalikwi@yahoo.com

0752416890 and 0782416890

2. Wizarts Foundation

Iguma Gabriel, Executive Director

gabriel.iguma@wizartsfoundation.org

Cell: +256782600607

3. Uganda National NGO Forum

Richard Ssewakiryanga, Executive Director

r.ssewakiryanga@ngoforum.or.ug

0772408365

4. Uganda Human Rights Commission

Kamadi Byonabye, Director

Rosemary Kemigisha

5. Platform for Labour Action

Grace Mukwaya Lule, Executive Director

asstdirector@pla-uganda.org

0787462960

6. Uganda Youth Network

Ronald Otim

otim@uyonet.or.ug

0773000788 and 0706838184

7. Human Rights Centre Uganda

Faridah Kyomuhangi, Manager Programs

fkyomuhangi@hrcug.org

07824381869

8. Uganda Media Women’s Association

Margret Sentamu, Executive Director

margarettino@gmail.com

0772469363

9. Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group

Julius Mukunda, Executive Director

jmukunda@csbag.org

10. Uganda Project Management and Implementation Centre

Peter Bogere, Coordinator,

Civic Education Resource Centre

bogepitas14@gmail.com

0781187136

11. ALLIANCE FOR FINANCE MONITORING - ACFIM

Henry Muguzi, Executive Director

> International Consultant

> Electoral Governance, Civic Engagement, Monitoring & Evaluation

> P.O .Box 24926 Kampala

> TEL: +256-773-001434 / +256 704934668

> Skype: henry.muguzi

12. Amuria District Development Agency

Nathan Ebiru, Executive Director

amuriadda@gmail.com

0774053972

Appendix 3: Research/Data Collection Instruments

1. Background Information
 - a. Name(s), Position & Contact ----- (optional)
 - b. Organisation -----
 - c. Relationship with CBR -----
 - d. Relationship with DGF -----
2. Did you receive any direct form of technical support from Centre for Basic Research (CBR) Yes/No. (Either way, **probe further to understand whether they had encountered CBR research or other project activities**)?
3. Did you/your organisation sign a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with CBR? (**probe further to determine the extent to which the objectives of the MoU were accomplished, and with what outputs, outcomes and impacts**)
4. What kind of support was provided by CBR or by your organisation to CBR?
5. What were the outputs, outcomes and impacts of such support, if any?
6. How satisfied are you with the support received from CBR or given to CBR?
7. To what extent did CBR contribute to advancing the broader goals of enhancing civic education in Uganda?
8. In which ways would CBR better enhance civic education practices in Uganda?
9. Who would benefit from CBR's work on civic education in Uganda?
10. What are your general comments and observations about CBR's work on civic education?
11. How can you use in the future the knowledge that you gained by working with CBR?
12. Did you encounter any communication difficulties (i.e. language issues etc.) with the staff of CBR while offering civic education? If so, please specify.
13. Are there any changes you would like to propose in regard to the services offered by CBR?

14. Please comment on the following

- a. How the government in upholding citizens' rights
- b. Level of inclusion of key issues raised by DGF IPs in government decision making
- c. Citizen focussed issues taken on by government
- d. Satisfaction with CBR support in enhancing civic engagement

Expert seminar Participants Tool

Introduction

Centre for Basic Research (CBR) has, since June 2018, been implementing a project titled: **'Strengthening Evidence-based Democratic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda'**, supported by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF). The project is premised on the assumption that *civic education is one of the foundations upon which democracy thrives*. Via the project, CBR seeks to produce, manage, and disseminate knowledge that enables civic education stakeholders and practitioners to productively and meaningfully engage duty bearers and the citizenry to enhance democratic governance practices.

You have been purposefully selected as an individual to take part in this Satisfaction Survey with CBR's work, so far, in order to enrich and improve not just CBR's work but the contribution of all stakeholders who are involved in civic education as a critical element of democratic governance in the country.

SECTION A

Please answer the following questions

1. Gender (a) Male (b) Female (c) Other (d) Chose not to mention

2. Level of education-----

3. Did you receive any direct form of technical support from Centre for Basic research (CBR)?

(a) Yes (b) No

4. Are you aware of the 'Strengthening Evidence-based Domestic Governance Agenda Setting and Engagement by Civil Society in Uganda' project?

(a) Yes (b) No

5. Which of the following category do you follow into?

Category	Tick
a). CBR research fellow	
b). DGF implementing partner.....	
c). Civic Education Coalition of Uganda	
d). Ministry of Information	
e). National Guidance (MICT&NG)	
f). Ministry of Information, Communication, Technology (ICT)	
g). UPDF [Uganda People's Defence Forces]	
h). NALI [National Leadership Institute] - Kyankwanzi	
i). UPF [Uganda Police Force]	
j). UHRC [Uganda Human Rights Commission]	
k). Judicial Service Commission	
l). National Secretariat for Patriotism Corps, Office of the President	
m). Other Government Departments, Ministries and Agencies (MDAs)	
n). Media organization/practitioner	
o). Other Category (mention) _____	

6. Please tick where applicable

Statement	Tick	
	Yes	No
a. I have received a copy of the Centre for Basic Research Book on 'Controlling Consent'		
b. I have received copies of other CBR Books and working papers		
c. I have visited CBR website over the past 12 months		
d. I have visited CBR premises, at 15 Baskerville Avenue, Kololo, on official business		
e. I have visited the CBR Library and documentation centre over the past 12 months		

f. I have read about, heard about, watched or listened to media coverage on, CBR project activities under the DGF project, including the different media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, among others.		
g. I have been in contact, or have communicated, with a staff or researcher from CBR by email, telephone or physically over the past 12 months.		
h. I have attended and participated in at least one CBR Monthly Expert Seminar on Civic Education.		
i. I have attended at least one CBR workshop on validation or dissemination of research reports over the past 12 months.		
j. I have attended CBR Monthly Expert Seminars of Civic Education as either Keynote speaker or discussant.		

7. If yes, to either question h, i, or j or all the three, please answer the following questions

- a. How many seminars have you attend?
- b. What was your overall assessment of the general contribution of the Monthly Expert Seminars to enhancement of good governance?
- c. What was your assessment of the themes selected for the various Monthly Expert Seminars attended?
- d. What was your assessment of the Keynote Speaker selected for the particular expert Seminars;
- e. What was your key take home message(s) from the Monthly Expert Seminars you attended?
- f. In what ways did the various Monthly Expert Seminars generally impact on you as an individual, and specifically, with regard to the following:
 - a. Civic Knowledge.
 - b. Civic skills
 - c. Civic Dispositions
- g. What aspects of the Monthly Expert Seminars require improvement and in which ways may this be achieved?
- h. In what other ways may Civic Education be improved upon in Uganda? Who is best suited to do so?
- i. How can you use in the future the knowledge that you gained by working with CBR?
- j. How can you use in the future the knowledge that you gained by working with CBR?
- k. Did you encounter any communication difficulties (i.e. language issues etc.) with the staff of CBR while offering civic education? If so, please specify.
- l. What was your favorite part of the seminar series?

8. On a scale of 1 to 5 that is; excellent (5), Very Good (4), good (3), fair (2) and Poor (1) please rate the following in regards to the seminar series

Quality of seminars, Accessibility of the seminar venue, Reliability of seminars and Overall satisfaction with CBR seminars

9. Do you have any additional comments or feedback

